Microcode is an abstraction layer on top of the physical components of a CPU and present in most generalpurpose CPUs today. In addition to facilitate complex and vast instruction sets, it also provides an update mechanism that allows CPUs to be patched in-place without requiring any special hardware. While it is well-known that CPUs are regularly updated with this mechanism, very little is known about its inner workings given that microcode and the update mechanism are proprietary and have not been throughly analyzed yet.
Introduction
Similar to complex software systems, bugs exist in virtually any commercial Central Processing Unit (CPU) and can imply severe consequences on system security, e.g., privilege escalation [22, 36] or leakage of cryptographic keys [11] . Errata sheets from embedded to general-purpose processors list incorrect behavior with accompanying workarounds to safeguard program execution [4, 29] . Such workarounds contain instructions for developers on how these bugs can be bypassed or mitigated, e.g., by means of recompilation [40] or binary re-translation [26] . However, these interim solutions are not suited for complex design errors which require hardware modifications [48] . Dedicated hardware units to counter bugs are imperfect [36, 49] and involve nonnegligible hardware costs [8] . The infamous Pentium fdiv bug [62] illustrated a clear economic need for field updates after deployment in order to turn off defective parts and patch erroneous behavior. Note that the implementation of a modern processor involves millions of lines of HDL code [55] and verification of functional correctness for such processors is still an unsolved problem [4, 29] .
Since the 1970s, x86 processor manufacturers have used microcode to decode complex instructions into series of simplified microinstructions for reasons of efficiency and diagnostics [43] . From a high-level perspective, microcode is an interpreter between the user-visible Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) and internal hardware based on Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) paradigms [54] . Although microcode was initially implemented in read-only memory, manufacturers introduced an update mechanism by means of a patch Random Access Memory (RAM).
Once erroneous CPU behavior is discovered, manufacturers publish a microcode update, which is loaded through the BIOS/UEFI or operating system during the boot process. Due to the volatility of the patch RAM, microcode updates are not persistent and have to be reloaded after each processor reset. On the basis of microcode updates, processor manufacturers obtain flexibility and reduce costs of correcting erroneous behavior. Note that both Intel and AMD deploy a microcode update mechanism since Pentium Pro (P6) in 1995 [15, 30] and K7 in 1999 [2, 15] , respectively. Unfortunately, CPU vendors keep information about microcode secret. Publicly available documentation and patents merely state vague claims about how real-world microcode might actually look like, but provide little other insight.
Goals. In this paper, we focus on microcode in x86 CPUs and our goal is to answer the following research questions:
1. What is microcode and what is its role in x86 CPUs? 2. How does the microcode update mechanism work? 3. How can the proprietary microcode encoding be reverse engineered in a structured, semi-automatic way?
4. How do real-world systems profit from microcode and how can malicious microcode be leveraged for attacks?
In order to answer question (1), we emphasize that information regarding microcode is scattered among many sources (often only in patents). Hence, an important part of our work is dedicated to summarize this prerequisite knowledge forming the foundation to answer the more in-depth research questions. Furthermore, we tackle shortcomings of prior attempted security analyses of x86 microcode, which were not able to reverse engineer microcode [6, 15] . We develop a novel technique to reverse engineer the encoding and thus answer question (2) . After we obtain a detailed understanding of the x86 microcode for several CPU architectures, we can address question (3) . As a result, we obtain an understanding of the inner workings of CPU updates and can even generate our own updates. In particular, we focus on potential applications of microprograms for both defensive and offensive purposes to answer question (4) . We demonstrate how a microprogram can be utilized to instrument a binary executable on the CPU layer and we also introduce different kinds of backdoors that are enabled via microcode updates.
Our analysis focuses on the AMD K8/K10 microarchitecture since these CPUs do not use cryptographic signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of microcode updates. Note that Intel started to cryptographically sign microcode updates in 1995 [15] and AMD started to deploy strong cryptographic protection in 2011 [15] . We assume that the underlying microcode update mechanism is similar, but cannot analyze the microcode updates since we cannot decrypt them.
Contributions. In summary, our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
• In-depth Analysis of Microcode. We provide an in-depth overview of the opaque role of microcode in modern CPUs. In particular, we present the fundamental principles of microcode updates as deployed by vendors to patch CPU defects and errors.
• Novel RE Technique. We introduce the first semiautomatic reverse engineering technique to disclose microcode encoding of general-purpose CPUs. Furthermore, we describe the design and implementation of our framework that allows us to perform this reverse engineering.
• Comprehensive Evaluation. We demonstrate the efficacy of our technique on several Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) AMD x86 CPU architectures. We provide the microcode encoding format and report novel insights into AMD x86 CPU internals. Additionally, we present our hardware reverse engineering findings based on delayering actual CPUs.
• Proof-of-Concept Microprograms. We are the first to present fully-fledged microprograms for x86 CPUs. Our carefully chosen microprograms highlight benefits as well as severe consequences of unveiled microcode to real-world systems.
Related Work
Before presenting the results of our analysis process, we briefly review existing literature on microprogramming and related topics.
Microprogramming. Since Wilkes' seminal work in 1951 [61] , numerous works in academia as well as industry adopted and advanced microprogrammed CPU designs. Diverse branches of research related to microprogramming include higher-level microcode languages, microcode compilers and tools, and microcode verification [5, 43, 56] . Other major research areas focus on optimization of microcode, i.e., minimizing execution time and memory space [32] . In addition, several applications of microprogramming were developed [27] such as diagnostics [41] .
Since microcode of today's x86 CPUs has not been publicly documented yet, several works attempted a highlevel security analysis for CPUs from both Intel and AMD [6, 15] . Even though these works reported the workings of the microcode update mechanism, the purpose of fields within the microcode update header, and the presence of other metadata, none of the works was able to reverse engineer the essential microcode encoding. Hence, they were not able to build microcode updates on their own.
We want to note that Arrigo Triulzi presented at TROOPERS'15 and '16 that he had been able to patch the microcode of an AMD K8 microarchitecture [59, 60] . However, he did neither publish the details of his reverse engineering nor the microcode encoding.
Imperfect CPU Design. Although microcode updates can be leveraged to rectify some erroneous behavior, it is not a panacea. Microcode updates are able to degrade performance due to additional condition checks and they cannot be applied in all cases. An infamous example is AMD's K7, where the microcode update mechanism itself was defective [2, 15] . In order to tackle these shortcomings, diverse techniques have been proposed including dy-namic instruction stream editing [16] , field-programmable hardware [49] , and hardware checks [8, 36] .
Trusted Hardware. The security of applications and operating systems builds on top of the security of the underlying hardware. Typically software is not designed to be executed on untrusted or potentially malicious hardware [11, 20, 22] . Once hardware behaves erroneously (regardless of whether deliberately or not), software security mechanisms can be invalidated. Numerous secure processors have been proposed over the years [18, 23, 37] .
Commercially available examples include technologies such as Intel SGX [17] and AMD Pacifica [3] .
However, the periodicity of security-critical faults [4, 29] and undocumented debug features [22] in closedsource CPU architectures challenges their trustworthiness [17, 45] .
Microcode
As noted earlier, microcode can be seen as an abstraction layer on top of the physical components of a CPU. In this section, we provide a general overview of the mechanisms behind microcode and also cover details about the microcode structure and update mechanism.
Overview
The ISA provides a consistent interface to software and defines instructions, registers, memory access, I/O, and interrupt handling. This paper focuses on the x86 ISA, and to avoid confusion, we refer to x86 instructions as macroinstructions. The microarchitecture describes how the manufacturer leveraged processor design techniques to implement the ISA, i.e., cache size, number of pipeline stages, and placement of cells on the die. From a highlevel perspective, the internal components of a processor can be subdivided into data path and control unit. The data path is a collection of functional units such as registers, data buses, and Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU). The control unit contains the Program Counter (PC), the Instruction Register (IR) and the Instruction Decode Unit (IDU). The control unit operates diverse functional units in order to drive program execution. More precisely, the control unit translates each macroinstruction to a sequence of actions, i.e., retrieve data from a register, perform a certain ALU operation, and then write back the result. The control signal is the collection of electrical impulses the control unit sends to the different functional unit in one clock cycle. The functional units produce status signals indicating their current state, i.e., whether the last ALU operation equals zero, and report this feedback to the control unit. Based on the status signals, the control unit may alter program execution, i.e., a conditional jump is taken if the zero flag is set.
The IDU plays a central role within the control unit and generates control signals based on the contents of the instruction register. We distinguish between two IDU implementation concepts: (1) hardwired and (2) microcoded.
Hardwired Decode Unit. A hardwired decode unit is implemented through sequential logic, typically a Finite State Machine (FSM), to generate the instruction-specific sequence of actions. Hence, it provides high efficiency in terms of speed. However, for complex ISAs the lack of hierarchy in an FSM and state explosion pose challenging problems during the design and test phases [50] . Hardwired decode units inhibit flexible changes in the late design process, i.e., correcting bugs that occurred during test and verification, because the previous phases have to be repeated. Furthermore, post-manufacturing changes (to correct bugs) require modification of the hardware, which is not (economically) viable for deployed CPUs [62] . Hence, hardwired decode units are suited for simple ISAs such as RISC processors like SPARC and MIPS.
Microcoded Decode Unit. In contrast to the hardwired approach, the microcoded IDU does not generate the control signals on-the-fly, but rather replays precomputed control words. We refer to one control word as microinstruction. A microinstruction contains all control information required to operate all involved functional units for one clock cycle. We refer to a plurality of microinstructions as microcode. Microinstructions are fetched from the microcode storage, often implemented as on-chip Read-Only Memory (ROM). The opcode bytes of the currently decoded macroinstruction are leveraged to generate an initial address, which serves as the entry point into microcode storage. Each microinstruction is followed by a sequence word, which contains the address to the next microinstruction. The sequence word may also indicate that the decoding process of the current macroinstruction is complete. It should be noted that one macroinstruction often issues more than one microinstruction. The microcode sequencer operates the whole decoding process, successively selecting microinstructions until the decode complete indicator comes up. The microcode sequencer also handles conditional microcode branches supported by some microarchitectures. Precomputing and storing control words introduces flexibility: Changes, patches, and adding new instructions can be moved to the late stages of the design process. The design process is simplified because changes in decode logic only require adaption of the microcode ROM content. On the downside, decoding latency increases due to ROM fetch and multistage decode logic. A microcoded IDU is the prevalent choice for commercial CISC processors.
Microcode Structure
Two common principles exist to pack control signals into microinstructions. This choice greatly influences the whole microarchitecture and has a huge impact on the size of microcode programs.
Horizontal Encoding. The horizontal encoding designates one bit position in the microinstruction for each control signal of all functional units. For the sake of simple logic and speed, no further encoding or compression is applied. This results in broad control words, even for small processors. The historical IBM System/360 M50 processor with horizontally-encoded microcode used 85-bit control words [53] . The nature of horizontal microcode allows the programmer to explicitly address several functional units at the same time to launch parallel computations, thus using the units efficiently. One disadvantage is the rather large microcode ROM due to the long control words.
Vertical Encoding. Vertically encoded microcode may look like a common RISC instruction set. The microinstruction usually contains an opcode field that selects the operation to be performed and additional operand fields. The operand fields may vary in number and size depending on the opcode and specific flag fields. Bit positions can be reused efficiently, thus the microinstructions are more compact. The lack of explicit parallelism simplifies the implementation of microcode programs, but may impact performance. One encoded operation may activate multiple control signals to potentially several functional units. Hence, another level of decoding is required. The microcode instruction set and encoding should be chosen carefully to keep the second-level decoding overhead minimal.
Microcode Updates
One particular benefit of microcoded microarchitectures is the capability to install changes and bug fixes in the late design process. This advantage can be extended even further: With the introduction of microcode updates, one can alter processor behavior even after production. Manufacturers leverage microcode patches for debugging purposes and fixing processor errata. The well-known fdiv bug [62] , which affected Intel Pentium processors in 1994, raised awareness that similarly to software, complex hardware is error-prone, too. This arguably motivated manufacturers to drive forward the development of microcode update mechanisms. Typically, a microcode patch is uploaded to the CPU by the motherboard firmware (e.g., BIOS or UEFI) or the operating system during the early boot process. Microcode updates are stored in low-latency, volatile, on-chip RAM. Consequently, microcode patches are not persistent. Usually, the microcode patch RAM is fairly limited in size compared to microcode ROM. A microcode patch contains a number of microinstructions, sequence words, and triggers. Triggers represent conditions upon which the control is transferred from microcode ROM to patch RAM. In a typical use case, the microcode patch intercepts the ROM entry point of a macroinstruction. During instruction decode, the microcode sequencer checks the triggers and redirects control to the patch RAM if needed. A typical microcode program residing in patch RAM then may, for example, sanitize input data in the operands and transfer control back to the microcode ROM.
Reverse Engineering Microcode
In this section, we provide an overview of the AMD K8 and K10 microarchitecture families and describe our reverse engineering approach. Furthermore, we present our analysis setup and framework that includes prototype implementations of our concepts and supported our reverse engineering effort in a semi-automated way.
Our analysis primarily covers AMD K8 and K10 processors because-to the best of our knowledge-they are the only commercially available, modern x86 microarchitectures lacking strong cryptographic protection of microcode patches.
AMD K8 and K10
AMD released new versions of its K8 and K10 processors from 2003 to 2008 and 2008 to 2013, respectively. Note that the actual production dates may vary and in 2013 only two low-end CPU models with K10 architecture were released. K9 is the K8's dual-core successor, hence the difference is marginal from our point of view. Family 11h and 12h are adapted K10 microarchitectures for mobile platforms and APUs.
All of theses microarchitectures include a microcoded IDU. The x86 instruction set is subdivided into direct path and vector path macroinstructions. The former mainly represent the frequently used, performance critical macroinstructions (e.g., arithmetic and logical operations) that are decoded by hardware into up to three microinstructions. The latter are uncommon or complex, and require decoding by the microcode sequencer and microcode ROM. Vector path macroinstructions may produce many microinstructions. During execution of the microcode sequencer, hardware decoding is paused. The microcode is structured in triads of three 64-bit microinstructions and one 32-bit sequence word [15] . An example microinstruction set is described in AMD's patent RISC86 [24] from 2002. The sequence word may contain the address of the next triad or indicate that decoding is complete. The microcode ROM is addressed in steps whose length is a triad. An example address space ranging from 0x0 to 0xbff thus contains 3,072 triads. The microcode is responsible for the decoding of vector path macroinstructions and handling of exceptions, such as page faults and divide-by-zero errors.
Update Mechanism
The K7, released in 1999, was AMD's first microarchitecture supporting microcode updates. The update mechanism did not change throughout to the 12h family. AMD kept the update feature secret until it was exposed along with three K8 microcode patches in 2004. The patches and the update mechanism were reverse engineered from BIOS updates [6] . The microcode updates are stored in a proprietary file format, although pieces of information have been reverse engineered [6, 15] . With the K10 microarchitecture, AMD started to publicly release microcode updates, which benefits the Linux open-source microcode update driver. Our view of the file format is depicted in Table 1 including the header with checksum and number of triads, match register fields, and triads. It should be noted that triads in microcode updates are obfuscated with an algorithm we do not specify further due to ethical considerations. B↓ Microcode Update Procedure. The microcode update binary is uploaded to the CPU in the following way: First, the patch must be placed in accessible virtual address space. Then the 64-bit virtual address must be written to Model-Specific Register (MSR) 0xc0010020. Depending on the update size and microarchitecture, the wrmsr instruction initiating the update may take around 5,000 cycles to complete. Rejection of a patch causes a general protection fault. Internally, the update mechanism verifies the checksum, copies the triads to microcode patch RAM, and stores the match register fields in the actual match registers. Patch RAM is mapped into the address space of the microcode ROM, whereby the patch triads directly follow the read-only triads.
Match Registers. The match registers are an integral part of the update mechanism. They hold a microcode ROM address, intercept the triad stored at that location, and redirect control to the triad in patch RAM at the offset match register index · 2. The shared address space enables microcode in the patch RAM to jump back to microcode ROM, e.g., to reuse existing triads. Due to the complexity of the microcode update procedure we assume it is implemented in microcode itself. We summarize our understanding of the microcode update mechanism in Figure 1 . AMD's patent [39] from 2002 describes an example microcode patch device and provides an idea of how the internals work. 
Reverse Engineering Methods
Based on our insights into microcode and its update mechanism, we now detail our novel method used to reverse engineer the microcode encoding. More precisely, we employ a (1) low-noise environment as a foundation for the novel (2) microcode ROM heat map generation, and (3) the microcode encoding reverse engineering. Furthermore, we present (4) microcode hooking which ultimately enables actual modification of CPU behavior.
We would like to emphasize that our methods were developed when we did not have access to microcode ROM, see Section 6.
Low-Noise Environment. Since we did not have access to CPU internals, we had to be able to apply our crafted microcode updates and carefully analyze the modified CPU's behavior (e.g., register values and memory locations). To pinpoint exactly where the changes caused effects (down to a single macroinstruction), we had to eliminate any noise from parallel or operating system code executions out of our control. For example, common operating systems implement task switching or fully symmetric multiprocessing, which is undesirable in our setting. This code execution is capable of triggering abnormal behavior (because of our microcode update) and then most likely causes a system crash. Hence, we require a low-noise environment where we have full control of all code to realize accurate observation of the CPU state and behavior.
Microcode ROM Heat Maps. As described in Section 4.2, match registers hold microcode ROM addresses. Since we did not know which microcode ROM addresses belong to which macroinstructions, we were not able to change the behavior for a specific microcoded macroinstruction. Hence, we devised microcode ROM heat maps, a method to discover the corresponding memory location for microcoded macroinstructions.
The underlying idea is to generate distinct behavior between the original and the patched macroinstruction execution. More precisely, the patch contains a microcode instruction that always crashes on execution. Thereby, we generate a heat map for each macroinstruction in an automated way: we store whether the microcode ROM address causes a system crash or not. The comparison between original and patched execution reveals which microcode ROM addresses correspond to the macroinstruction. We further automatically processed all heat maps to exclude common parts among all macroinstructions.
Microcode Encoding Reverse Engineering. Based on our automatically generated heat maps, we were able to tamper with a specific microcoded macroinstruction. However, we could not meaningfully alter an instruction because of its proprietary encoding. Hence, we developed a novel technique to reverse engineer proprietary microcode encoding in a semi-automatic way.
Since we did not have a large microcode update base on which we could perform fine-grained tests, we merely had a black box model of the CPU. However, since microinstructions control ALU and register file accesses, we formed various general assumptions about the instruction fields, which can be systematically tested using semiautomatic tests (e.g., opcode, immediate value, source and destination register fields).
In order to reverse engineer the encoding, we applied a two-tiered approach. First, we identified fields by means of bits that cause similar behavior, i.e., change of used registers, opcode, and immediate value. Second, we exhaustively brute-forced each field to identify all addressable values. Since corresponding fields are small (< 10 bits), we combined the results together and gradually formed a model of the encoding. Note that through detailed exception reporting and paging, we were able to gather detailed information on why a specific microinstruction caused a crash. Earlier in the reverse engineering process, we set the three microinstructions in a triad to the same value to avoid side effects from other unknown microinstructions. Once we had a better understanding of the encoding, we padded the triad with no-operation microin-structions. Later in the reverse engineering process, we designed tests that reuse microinstructions from existing microcode updates. For that method to be successful, a good understanding of the operand fields was required as most of these microinstructions operate on internal registers. We had to rewrite the register fields to be able to directly observe the effect of the microinstruction. Furthermore, we designed automated tests that identified set bits in unknown fields of existing microinstructions and permuted the affected bit locations in order to provoke observable differences in behavior that can be analyzed.
Microcode Hooks. After reverse engineering the microcode encoding, we can arbitrarily change CPU behavior for any microcoded macroinstruction and intercept control for any microcode ROM address. Note that we intercepted a macroinstruction at the entry point microcode ROM address. In order to realize a fully-fledged microcode hook mechanism, we have to correctly pass back control after interception through our microcode update. This is indispensable in case macroinstructions are extended with functionality, such as a conditional operand check, while preserving original functionality.
We employed two basic concepts to resume macroinstruction computation after interception: (1) pass control back to ROM, and (2) implement the macroinstruction computation. Note that we implemented both resume strategies, see Section 7.
Framework
One fundamental requirement for our framework was automated testing. Combined with the fact that microcode updates potentially reset or halt the entire machine, it became apparent that another controller computer was needed. In the following, we describe both our hardware setup and our framework implementation.
Hardware Setup. From a high-level point of view, the hardware setup consists of multiple nodes and several development machines. Each node represents one minimal computer with an AMD CPU that runs our low-noise environment and is connected to a Raspberry Pi via serial bus. To enable monitoring and control, the mainboard's power and reset switch as well as the power supply's +3.3V are connected to GPIO ports. The Raspberry Pis run Linux and can be remotely controlled from the Internet. The development machines are used to design test cases and extend the microcode API. Furthermore, test cases can be launched from the development machines. This process automatically transfers the test case and the latest API version to the desired nodes, which then autonomously execute the test case and store the results. Our test setup consists of three nodes with K8 Sempron 3100+ (2004), K10 Athlon II X2 260 (2010), and K10 Athlon II X2 280 (2013) processors.
Low-Noise Environment. To fulfil our unusual requirements regarding the execution environment (e.g., full control over interrupts and all code being executed), we implemented a simple operating system from scratch. It supports interrupt and exception handling, virtual memory, paging, serial connection, microcode updates, and execution of streamed machine code. The streamed machine code serves the purpose of bringing the CPU to the desired initial state, executing arbitrary macroinstructions, and observing the final state of the CPU. We leveraged this feature primarily to execute vector path instructions intercepted by a microcode patch. This way, we can infer the effects of triads, single microinstructions, and the sequence word. Note that only the final state can be observed in case no exception occurs.
We implemented interrupt and exception handling in order to observe the intermediate state of the CPU and the exception code such as general protection faults. The error state includes the faulting program counter and stack pointer as well as the x86 general-purpose registers. We refined the preciseness of the error reporting by implementing virtual memory and paging support. All exceptions related to memory accesses raise page faults with additional information such as the faulting address and action. This information, paired with the information about the faulting program counter, allows us to distinguish between invalid read, write, and execution situations. We also used the exception code and observed the intermediate state to infer the effects of microcode. A custom message protocol exposes the following operating system features via serial connection: (1) stream x86 machine code, (2) send and apply microcode update, and (3) report back the final or intermediate CPU state. Some of the test processors support x86 64 long mode, which lets the CPU access 64-bit instructions and registers. However, our operating system runs in 32-bit protected mode.
Microcode API. Our controller software is implemented in Python and runs on the Raspberry Pis. It processes test cases in an automated fashion and makes heavy use of the microcode API. Test cases contain an initial CPU state, arbitrary x86 instructions, the final CPU state, and an exception information filter plus a logger as well as a high-level microcode patch description. The microcode patch is generated with the high-level microcode patch information that includes header fields, match register values, and microcode in the form of bit vectors, Register Transfer Level (RTL) machine language, or a mix. Test cases incorporating automation must specify at least one property that will be altered systematically. For example, a test case that aims to iteratively intercept all triads in microcode ROM may increment the match register value in each pass. Another test case that attempts to infer conditional behavior of microcode may alter streamed x86 machine code in order to induce different x86 eflags regis-ter values and at the same time permute the bit vector of an unknown field within a microinstruction. The microcode API exposes all required underlying features such as serial connection handling, serial message protocol, AMD computer power state monitoring and control, x86 assembler, parsing and generation of microcode updates, obfuscation and deobfuscation of microcode updates, microcode assembler and disassembler as well as required data structures. The framework runs through 190 test iterations per minute and node in case there are no faults. One fault adds a delay of 12 seconds due to the reboot.
Microcode Specification
In this section we present the results of our reverse engineering effort such as heat maps, a detailed description of the microcode instruction set, and intercepting x86 instructions. Furthermore, we present our microcode RTL.
DISCLAIMER. It should be noted that our results originate from reverse engineering include and indirectly measured behavior, assumptions about the microarchitecture, and interpretation of the visible CPU state, which is small in comparison to the whole unobservable CPU state. Thus, we cannot guarantee that our findings are intended behavior of AMD's microcode engine.
Heat Maps
A heat map of a specific macroinstruction contains a mapping of all microcode ROM addresses to a boolean value that indicates whether the specified triad is executed during the decode sequence of that macroinstruction. During the test cycle, our operating system executes vector instructions such as call and ret. We name a heat map that only covers vector instructions from the operating system reference heat map. In order to obtain a clean heat map for a vector instruction, the reference heat map must be subtracted from the instruction's raw heat map. For the interested reader we present a truncated, combined K10 heat map in Table 4 in Appendix A.1. The heat maps represent a fundamental milestone of our reverse engineering effort. They indicate microcode ROM locations to intercept macroinstructions and help infer logic from triads. We designed test cases for all vector path instructions, which then generated clean heat maps in a fully automated way.
Microcode Instruction Set
The microinstruction set presented in AMD's patent RISC86 [24] gave us a general understanding and valuable hints. However, we found that almost all details such as microinstruction length, operand fields, operations, and encoding differ. Furthermore, we could not confirm that single microinstructions can be addressed, which would result in the preceding microinstructions of the triad being ignored. Instead, we found that only entire triads are addressable. In the following, we reuse terminology from the patent where appropriate. Unless stated otherwise, all information given afterwards was obtained through reverse engineering.
We found four operation classes, namely RegOp, LdOp, StOp, and SpecOp, that are used for arithmetic and logic operations, memory reads, memory writes, and special operations such as write program counter, respectively. The structure of the four operation classes is shown in Table 2 . The different operation classes can be distinguished by the op class field at bit locations 37 to 39. RegOp and SpecOp share the same op class field encoding but have disjunct encodings for the operation type field. The unlabeled fields indicate unused or unknown bit locations. RegOp supports operation types such as arithmetic, comparators, and logic operations. The mul and imul operation types must be the first microinstruction within a triad in order to work. SpecOp enables to write the x86 program counter and to conditionally branch to microcode. If the conditional branch is taken, the microcode sequencer continues decoding at the given address. In case the conditional branch is not taken, the sequence word determines further execution. The condition to be evaluated is encoded in the 4 high bits of the 5-bit cc field. Bit 0 of the cc field inverts the condition if set. The available condition encodings match the ones given in patent RISC86 [24] , p. 37. The write-programcounter SpecOp must be placed third within a triad in order to work. We found that LdOp and StOp have their own operation types. Our collection of operation types is incomplete, because it was impossible to observe the internal state of the CPU. We show encoding details for the operation types we found in the Appendix in Table 5 . The fields reg1, reg2 and reg3 encode the microcode registers. In addition to the general-purpose registers, microcode can access a number of internal registers. Their content is only stored until the microinstruction has been decoded. The special pcd register is read-only and contains the address of the next macroinstruction to decode. This is valuable information to implement relative x86 jumps in microcode. The microarchitecture also contains a microcode substitution engine, which automatically replaces operand fields in the microinstruction with operands from the macroinstruction. The first two x86 operands can be accessed in microcode with the register encodings regmd and regd. We refer to Table 6 in the Appendix for encoding details of the microcode registers. We did not find the substitution mechanism for immediate values encoded in the macroinstruction. To solve this issue, we read the x86 instruction bytes from main memory and extract the immediate. The sw field swaps source and des-tination registers. The 3o field enables the three operand mode and allows RegOp microinstructions of the form reg2:= reg1 op reg3/imm. The flags field decides whether the resulting flags of the current RegOp microinstruction should be committed to the x86 flags register. The rmod field switches between reg3 and a 16-bit immediate value. The sequence word, see Table 3 , contains an action field at bit locations 14 to 16 that may indicate a branch to the triad at the given address, a branch to the following triad, or stop decoding of the current macroinstruction. Our disassembler has a coverage of approximately 40% of the instructions contained in existing microcode patches. However, we ignored bits in unknown fields of recognised microinstructions whose meaning we could not determine. We designed automated test cases that, e.g., permute the bits of an unknown microinstruction field to provoke observable differences in the final CPU state. Our result filter discarded outputs that match the expected CPU state. We then manually inspected the remaining interesting CPU states and inferred the meaning of the new encoding.
Intercepting x86 Instructions
Currently, we can only intercept vector instructions by writing related triad addresses from the heat maps into the match registers. We are uncertain whether a mechanism for hooking direct path instructions exists. It is relatively simple to replace the logic of a vector path instruction; however, it appeared challenging to add logic, because the original semantics must be preserved. To solve this issue, we leverage the two microcode hook concepts from Section 4.3. In the following we describe in detail the practical application of both concepts. (1) After executing the added logic, we jump back to microcode ROM. (2) After execution of the added logic we implement the semantics of the macroinstruction in microcode ourselves and indicate sequence complete in the last triad. This way, we successfully hooked shrd and imul vector path instructions.
We also successfully intercepted the div instruction using the first method. One fundamental limitation of hooking with match registers is that one cannot jump back to the intercepted triad, because the match register would redirect control again, essentially creating an endless loop. We are not aware of a feature to temporarily ignore a match register. Thus we need to intercept a negligible triad and, after execution of our logic, jump back to the subsequent triad, essentially skipping one triad. We inferred the observable part of the logic of div heat map triads. We proceeded by iteratively branching directly to the triads with a known CPU state with a match register hook set to the following triad. With this method we found one triad we can skip without visibly changing Index   63 62  54 53 52 51 46 45  40 39 37 36 30 29 24  23  22 16 15  0  RegOp  -type  sw 3o  reg1  -flags -000  -size  reg2  rmod  -imm16/reg3  LdOp  -type  sw 3o  reg1  -001  -reg2  rmod  -imm16/reg3  StOp  -type  sw 3o  reg1  -010  -size  reg2  rmod  -imm16/reg3  SpecOp  -type cc sw 3o  reg1  -000 -size reg2 -imm16/addr12 
Microcode RTL
We developed a microcode register transfer language based on the syntax of Intel x86 assembly language, because for the implementation of microprograms it is impractical to manually assemble bit vectors. In the following, we show a template for a typical microinstruction in our microcode RTL:
The insn field defines the operation. It is followed by one to three operands of which the first one is always the destination and only the last one may be an immediate.
In two-operand mode, the first operand is the destination and the source. There are dedicated load and store instructions. Memory addressing currently supports only one register, i.e., ld eax, [ebx] . The size of arithmetic operations is implicitly specified by the destination operand's size. Memory reads always fetch a whole native system word, and the size of memory writes is specified by the source operand's size. The conditional microcode branch encodes the condition in the first operand and the branch target in the second operand, i.e. jcc nZF, 0xfe5. The assembler automatically resolves constraints such as mul must be placed first in a triad and write-program-counter must be placed last. Strictly speaking the sequence words are not instructions, thus we cover them by directives such as .sw complete and .sw branch 0x7e6. The branch to next triad sequence words are added implicitly.
Hardware Analysis
In addition to the black box microcode reverse engineering presented in the previous section, we analyzed the CPU's hardware in a parallel approach. The goal of hardware analysis was to read and analyze the non-volatile microcode ROM to support reverse engineering of the microcode encoding. Furthermore, this allows us to analyze the actual implementation of microcoded macroinstructions.
Our chosen Device Under Test (DUT) is a Sempron 3100+ (SDA3100AIP3AX) with a 130nm technology size, since it features the largest size of the target CPU family (which facilitates our analysis). Note that the larger technology size allows for additional tolerance margins in both the delayering and the imaging of the individual structures. Similar to any common microcontroller or CPU, the DUT is built using a CMOS process with multiple layers. In contrast to traditional microcontrollers, general-purpose x86 CPUs feature a much larger die size and are stacked up to 12 layers, which increases hardware reverse engineering effort.
We expected the targeted non-volatile microcode ROM to be stored in a cell array architecture. Other memory types to implement microcode ROM, such as flash, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory (EEPROM), and RAM, are either too slow, unnecessarily large, or volatile. Note that the general die structure is almost identical to the die shot provided in [21] , which helped our initial analysis identify our Region Of Interest (ROI), the microcode ROM.
Delayering
After removing the heat sink with a drill, we fully decapsulated the die with fuming nitric acid [46] . In order to visualize the ROM array, we delayered (e.g., removed individual stacked layers) from the top of the die. The main challenge during delayering is to uniformly skim planar surfaces parallel to the individual layers. Typically, the delayering process alternates between removing a layer and imaging the layer beneath it [46] . Focusing on our ROI, we were able to neglect other areas of the chip resulting in a more planar surface in important region(s). Note that hardware reverse engineering of the whole CPU microarchitecture would require a more controlled delayering process and several months to acquire and process the whole layout. The interested reader is referred to our die shot in Figure 3 in the Appendix.
In order to remove layers, we used a combined approach of Chemical Mechanical Polishing (CMP) and plasma etching. During inspection of the seventh layer, we encountered the expected ROM array structure. We acquired images of individual layers using a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) since optical microscopy reaches diffraction limits at this structure size. Compared to colored and more transparent images from optical microscopy, SEM images only provide a gray-scale channel, but with higher magnification. In SEM images, different materials can be identified due to brightness yield.
We encountered multiple regular NOR ROM arrays using contact layer (vias) for programming. In NOR ROM with active layer programming, the logic state is encoded by the presence or absence of a transistor [52] . In our case an advanced bitline-folding architecture [31] encodes the logic state by either placing a via on the right or the left bitline. Note another property of this ROM type is that only a single via may be set at any time; setting both will result in a short circuit.
Overall, we identified three ROM blocks consisting of 8 subarrays. Each of the 3 ROM blocks has the capability to store 30 kB. Note that our results match the visible blocks in [21] . It is important to note that the vias' positions are hardwired and cannot be changed after shipping. The only possible way to patch bugs in the ROM is to employ the microcode update procedure described in Section 3.3.
Microcode Extraction
In Figure 2 , we highlighted how bits are programmed by this memory type. Bright spots represent a via going down from a metal line, which is either connected to GND or VCC. We chose to represent the individual cells as set to logical '1' if the left via was set and '0' if the right one was set. This convention does not necessarily correspond to the correct runtime interpretation. However, permutations are commonly applied to the ROM memory, hence a misinterpretation can be corrected in a later analysis step.
In order to analyze the microcode ROM bits for any permutations, we processed the acquired SEM images with rompar [7] . Using its image processing capabilities, we transformed the optical via positions into bit values.
Microcode ROM Bit Analysis. In order to group the bit values into microinstructions, we carefully analyzed the ROM structure and we made two crucial observations: (1) Each alternating column of bits is inverted due to mirroring of existing cells, which saves space on the die.
(2) Since the memory type employs a transposed bitline architecture [31] , the bit inversion has to be adjusted to each segment.
With both observations in mind, we were able to derive microinstructions from the images. Note that we also had to interleave the subarrays respectively to acquire 64 bits (size of a microinstruction) per memory row. Hence, the ROM allows us to find more complex microinstructions and experimentally reverse engineer their meaning.
Microprograms
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our reverse engineering effort by presenting microprograms that successfully augment existing x86 instructions and add foreign logic. With this paper, we also publish microcode patches [42] that are compiled from scratch and run on unmodified AMD CPUs, namely K8 Sempron 3100+ and K10 Athlon II X2 260/280. We found that the microcode ROM content varies between different processors, but the macroinstruction entry points into the microcode ROM are constant. Thus we assume our microcode patches are compatible with a wider range of K8/K10-based CPUs. We discuss additional applications of microcode in Section 8.
Instrumentation
Instrumentation monitors the execution of a program and may produce metadata or instruction traces. It is used by program analysis, system defenses, antivirus software, and performance optimization during software development. It has been proven challenging to implement performant instrumentation for COTS binaries. Several mechanisms exist such as function hooking, binary rewriting, virtual machine introspection, and in-place emulation.
However, they come with drawbacks such as coarse granularity, uncertain coverage, and high performance overhead. An instrumentation framework with CPU support based on microcode may evade many of the disadvantages. It should be noted that microcode also has limitations such as only 8 match registers. Currently we can only intercept vector path x86 instructions and the hooks are machine-wide, i.e., not limited to one user-space process. For demonstration purposes we implemented a simple instrumentation that counts the occurrences of the div instruction during execution. See Listing 1 for a highlevel representation of the instrumentation logic; we refer the interested reader to Listing 7 in Appendix A.3 for a detailed RTL implementation.
Listing 1: High-level description of the instrumentation logic implemented in microcode that counts the div instructions during execution.
Remote Microcode Attacks
Executing microcode Trojans is not limited to a local attacker. An injected microcode hook may lie dormant within a vector path macroinstruction, such as a div reg32, and it is triggered as soon as a specific trigger condition is met within an attacker-controlled web page. This is possible due to Just-in-Time (JIT) and Ahead-of-Time (AOT) compilers embedded in modern web browsers. They allow to emit specific machine code instructions only utilizing JavaScript (JS). Consider a microcode Trojan for the div instruction. We provide a high-level description of the Trojan logic in Listing 2.
if ( eax == A && ebx == B ) eip = eip + 1 Listing 2: High-level description of the microcode Trojan implemented in microcode that increments the eip to execute x86 instructions in a disaligned fashion.
If a div ebx instruction is executed while eax contains the value A (dividend) and ebx contains the value B (divisor), then the instruction pointer eip is increased, and execution continues in a misaligned way after the first byte of the instruction following the div ebx instruction. If the trigger condition is not met, the division is executed as expected. Hence, legitimate machine instructions as shown in Listing 3 may be misused to hide and execute arbitrary code.
B8 0 A000000 mov eax , 0 xA BB 0 B000000 mov ebx , 0 xB F7F3 div ebx 05 909090 CC add eax , 0 xCC909090
Listing 3: x86 machine code to trigger the div Trojan in Listing 2.
Due to the microcode Trojan within div ebx, which is triggered when the condition eax == A && ebx == B is met, the instruction following the division is executed starting at its second byte (Listing 4). Listing 4: x86 hidden payload executed due to the triggered microcode Trojan.
As shown in Listing 4, the hidden nop and int3 instructions within the constant value of the add instruction are executed instead of the legitimate add itself. Note that many add instructions can be used to hide an arbitrary payload (i.e., execve()) instead of nop and int3.
We were able to emit appropriate machine code instructions using the ASM.JS subset of the JS language in Mozilla Firefox 50. ASM.JS compiles a web page's JS code before it is actually transformed into native machine code. We hide our payload within four-byte JS constants of legitimate instructions similar to previous JIT Spraying attacks [12, 51] . Since we also control the dividend and divisor of the division, we eventually trigger the microcode Trojan in the div instruction, which in turn starts to execute our payload. Thus, we achieved to remotely activate the microcode hook and use it to execute remotely controlled machine code. We refer the interested reader to the ASM.JS code in Listing 9 in Appendix A.4. While usually constant blinding is used in JIT compilers to prevent the injection of valid machine code into JS constants, recent research has shown that browsers such as Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome fail to blind constants in certain cases [38] . Hence, we assume that remotely triggering a microcode Trojan and executing hidden code within other browsers (i.e., Edge or Chrome) is possible, too.
Cryptographic Microcode Trojans
In order to demonstrate further severe consequences of microcode Trojans, we detail how such Trojans facili-tate implementation attacks on cryptographic algorithms. More precisely, we present how microcode Trojans enable both (1) a bug attack (representative for Fault Injection (FI) [13] ) and (2) a timing attack for Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) [34] .
Preliminaries and Goal
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has become the prevalent public-key cryptographic primitive in real-world systems. In particular, numerous cryptographic libraries, e.g., OpenSSL and libsodium, employ Curve25519 [10] . Note that the critical scalar multiplication is generally implemented through a Montgomery ladder whose execution is expected to be constant time, see RFC7748 [1] .
Bug Attack. Bug attacks [9, 11] are associated with FI; however, they are conceptionally distinct. While FI mainly considers faults injected by an adversary, bug attacks rely on inherent computation bugs [47] and do neither suppose environmental tampering nor physical presence.
Timing Attack. Timing attacks [34] against cryptographic implementations are based on careful analysis of their execution time [14, 57] . Nowadays most libraries employ constant-time implementations as an effective countermeasure.
Our goal for each attack is to enable disclosure of the private key from ECDH key exchange. In order to realize microcode Trojans which facilitate such attacks, we have to arm a microcoded x86 instruction (used in scalar multiplication) with (1) an input-dependent trigger and (2) a payload inducing a conditional fault or additional time, see Listing 5.
if ( regmd == A ) regmd = regmd + C Listing 5: High-level microcode Trojan description within an x86 instruction to trigger a conditional bug using the first operand (regmd) of the x86 instruction and the immediate constants A and C.
Implementation
For both attacks, we use the constant-time ECC reference implementation from libsodium [35] compiled for 32-bit architectures. Since Curve25519 employs reduced-degree reduced-coefficient polynomials for arithmetic and the implementation uses 64-bit data types, the following C code is compiled to assembly in Listing 6: Listing 6: x86 machine code implementing 64-bit right shift using the shrd instruction.
This line of code processes internal (key-dependent) data as well as adversary-controlled (public-key dependent) data. We can remotely trigger the condition in the microcoded shrd instruction to apply both the bug attack and the timing attack. Note that in case of a timing-attack, we conditionally execute several nop instructions to induce a data-dependent timing difference.
For a detailed RTL implementation of the bug attack, we refer the interested reader to Listing 8 in Appendix A.3. We emphasize that the necessary primitives for bug attacks and timing side channel attacks can be created via microcode Trojans. This way, even state-of-the-art cryptographic implementations can be undermined.
Discussion

Security Implications
We demonstrated that malware can be implemented in microcode. Furthermore, malicious microcode updates can be applied to unmodified K8 and K10-based AMD CPUs. This poses a certain security risk. However, in a realistic attack scenario, an adversary must overcome other security measures. A remote attacker has to bypass application and operating system isolation in order to apply a microcode update. An attacker with system privileges might as well leverage less complex mechanisms with better persistence and stealth properties than microcode malware. An attacker with physical access may be able to embed a malicious microcode update into the BIOS or UEFI, i.e., in an evil maid scenario [44] . However, she has to overcome potential security measures such as TPM or signing of the UEFI firmware. Physical access also enables alternative attack vectors such as cloning the entire disk, or in case of full disk encryption, tamper with the MBR or bootloader. Other adversary models to provide malicious microcode (either through updates or directly in microcode ROM) become more realistic, i.e., intelligence agencies or untrusted foundries. From a hardware Trojan's perspective [58] , microcode Trojans provide post-manufacturing versatility, which is indispensable for the heterogeneity in operating systems and applications running on general-purpose CPUs.
Even though AMD emphasizes that their chips are secure [25] , the microcode update scheme of K8 and K10 shows once more that security by obscurity is not reliable and proper encryption, authentication, and integrity have to deployed. It should be noted that attacks leveraging microcode will be highly hardware-specific. Current AMD processors employ strong cryptographic algorithms to protect the microcode update mechanism [15] . Microcode and its effects on system security for current CPUs are unknown with no verifiable trust anchor. Both experts and users are unable to examine microcode updates for (un)intentional bugs.
Constructive Microcode Applications
We see great potential for constructive applications of microcode in COTS CPUs. We already discussed that microcode combines many advantages for binary instrumentation, see Section 7.1. This could aid program tracing, bug finding, tainting, and other applications of dynamic program analysis. Furthermore, microcode could boost the performance of existing system defenses. Microcode updates could also enable domain-specific instruction sets, e.g., special instructions that boost program performance or trustworthy security measures (similar to Intel SGX [17] ).
Hence, the view on microcode and its detailed embedding in the overall CPU architecture are a relevant topic for future research.
Generality
In addition to x86 CISC CPUs from Intel, AMD, and VIA, microcode is also used in CPUs based on RISC methodologies. For example, reverse engineering of an ARM1 processor [33] disclosed the presence of a decode Programmable Logic Array (PLA) storing microinstructions. The Intel i960 used microcode to implement several instructions [28] . Another noteworthy CPU is the EAL 7 certified AAMP7G by Rockwell Collins [19] . Its separation kernel microcode to realize Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) is accompanied with a formal proof.
Future Work
In future work we aim to further explore the microarchitecture and its security implications on system security. We want to highlight microcode capabilities and foster the security and computer architecture communities to incorporate this topic into their future research. We require further knowledge of implemented microarchitectures and update mechanisms to address both attack-and defense-driven research. For example, an open-source CPU variant for the security community can lead to in-strumentation frameworks and system defenses based on performant microprograms.
Conclusion
In this paper we successfully changed the behavior of common, general-purpose CPUs by modification of the microcode. We provided an in-depth analysis of microcode and its update mechanism for AMD K8 and K10 architectures. In addition, we presented what can be accomplished with this technology: First, we showed that augmenting existing instructions allows us to implement CPU-assisted instrumentation, which can enable highperformance defensive solutions in the future. Second, we demonstrated that malicious microcode updates can have security implications for software systems running on the hardware. The microinstruction structure provides two dedicated register fields. One additional register field can be unlocked by enabling register mode, which replaces the 16-bit immediate field. The register fields can encode a number of registers including x86 general-purpose registers and microcode registers. The microcode registers cannot be accessed by x86 instructions. The contents of the microcode registers are only persistent while one macroinstruction is decoded. Most of the microcode registers serve as general-purpose space for immediate values. However, special microcode registers exist that hold the next decode program counter (pcd) or always read as zero (zerod). We listed the microcode registers with mnemonics and encoding in Table 6 .
Size
Encoding 00  01  10  11  al  ax  eax  rax  000000  cl  cx  ecx  rcx  000001  dl  dx  edx  rdx  000010  bl  bx  ebx  rbx  000011  ah  sp  esp  rsp  000100  ch  bp  ebp  rbp  000101  dh  si  esi  rsi  000110  bh  di  edi  rdi  000111  t1l  t1w  t1d  t1q  001000  t2l  t2w  t2d  t2q  001001  t3l  t3w  t3d  t3q  001010  t4l  t4w  t4d  t4q  001011  t1h  t5w  t5d  t5q  001100  t2h  t6w  t6d  t6q  001101  t3h  t7w  t7d  t7q  001110  t4h  t8w  t8d  t8q  001111  regmb regmw regmd regmq  101000  regb  regw  regd  regq  101100  pcb pcw pcd pcq 111000 zerob zerow zerod zeroq 111111 Table 6 : General-purpose and microcode register encodings.
A.2 Hardware Analysis
In Section 6 we investigate the hardware of the AMD K8 Sempron 3100+. Hence, we decapsulated and backsidethinned a die to obtain a high-level view of the CPU structure. The marked areas are adopted from [21] , since they show multiple similarities with our die shot in Figure 3 . Note that we focus on the microcode ROM (marked in green) and neglect the rest of the chip. Figure 3 : Die shot of AMD K8 Sempron 3100+ with different CPU parts. The image was taken with an optical microscope with low magnification. The die is corrugated due to a remaining thickness below 10 micrometers.
A.3 Microprograms
In Section 7.1 we present a constructive application of microcode updates, namely program instrumentation. To demonstrate the feasibility, we implemented a proof-ofconcept instrumentation that counts the occurrences of the x86 instruction div during execution. It should be noted that the current implementation has some drawbacks, such as reserving two general-purpose registers to steer the instrumentation. However, this is not a fundamental limitation but an engineering issue. The implementation of our proof-of-concept instrumentation is given in Listing 7.
1 // set match register 0 to 0 x7e5 .sw_branch 0 x7e6
Listing 7: Microprogram that instruments the x86 instruction div and counts the occurrences.
As explained in Section 7.3, we exploit the x86 shrd instruction to implement both the bug attack and the timing attack. The bug attack in our RTL is shown in Listing 8. Note that in order to hook the shrd instruction, we have to set a match register to the address 0xaca. The magic constant as well as the bug value added to the final computation can be arbitrarily chosen. 1 // set match register 0 to 0 xaca .sw_complete Listing 8: Microprogram that intercepts the x86 instruction shrd and inserts a bug that can be leveraged for a bug attack.
A.4 Using ASM.JS to remotely trigger a x86 div microcode Trojan
As explained in Section 7.2, we use ASM.JS code in Firefox 50 to trigger the implemented x86 div Trojan. It is shown in Listing 9. Instead of using nop and int3 instructions, arbitrary payloads can be implemented. For example, the attacker might deploy a remote shell as soon as the microcode Trojan is triggered, which establishes a connection to her remote control server. We use a non -weaponized payload . Instructions 
